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REGIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE 
ROLE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
KRISTEN M. FLETCHER† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the two years since the Pew Ocean Commission and U.S. 
Ocean Commission recommendations, policymakers and ocean man-
agers have begun considering regional ocean governance (“ROG”) as 
a tool to better manage ocean and coastal resources and move toward 
ecosystem-based management of the oceans and coasts. A ROG 
mechanism would not start from scratch; to the contrary, regional (or 
in some circumstances “multi-state”) efforts have existed for decades. 
The elevation of ROG to the position of a structural foundation for 
state, regional, and national marine resource management requires 
consideration of the historical underpinnings of ocean and coastal 
management, namely the Public Trust Doctrine (“PTD” or “Doc-
trine”) and its role in moving governance structures toward effective 
ecosystem-based management. 
The PTD is relevant not only in the establishment of ROG, but 
also in its implementation. This article presents background and 
emerging questions for the role of the PTD, at state, regional, and na-
tional landscapes. First, from the state perspective, the PTD is an ex-
isting tool for management of marine public trust resources. Does the 
existence of the Doctrine negate the need for a state to participate in 
ROG and, if not, will conflicts that exist between states in their appli-
cation of the Doctrine affect ROG? Second, from the regional per-
spective, does ROG create an underlying public trust responsibility 
on a regional level through an interest based on conservation or on 
use? Third, from a national perspective, given the emergence of ROG 
 
 † Director, Marine Affairs Institute and Rhode Island Sea Grant Legal Program, Roger 
Williams University. Special thanks to Ingrid Nugent, Mark Hill, and Sarah Doverspike who 
thoughtfully organized the Regional Ocean Governance Symposium in 2005 and this journal 
issue. This article is based on a talk given at Duke Law School in October 2005 and is dedicated 
to Professor Conrad Kellenberg who celebrated 50 years of teaching in 2005, including three 
inspiring years during which he was instrumental in the professional and personal development 
of the author. Cheers, Professor, and thanks for reminding me why I became a lawyer. 
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and the inherent role of states, will the Doctrine evolve into a multi-
jurisdictional approach for the furtherance of ecosystem-based man-
agement? This article addresses these elements from the perspective 
of the Northeast region,1 within the context of two ROG related 
events in 2005: the establishment of the Northeast Regional Ocean 
Council and the ocean governance resolutions adopted by leaders in 
the region. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine in its Historical Context 
At the state level, uses and management of marine resources 
have evolved within the context of the PTD,2 the origins of which date 
to the Roman Empire.3 The Doctrine provides that public trust lands, 
waters, and living resources are held by a state in trust for benefit of 
its people, and that they may use these resources for navigation, fish-
ing, commerce, and (in more recent years) recreation.4 
The original Roman Public Trust principles influenced the laws 
of the English, Spanish, French, and Dutch, and their respective colo-
nies. In the United States, the original thirteen colonies, and states 
that joined the United States following the American Revolution, fol-
lowed the English common law as to sovereign ownership of tidelands 
with some variation. Under the constitutional principle of the Equal 
Footing Doctrine, state ownership of tidelands was extended to all 
 
 1. Depending on which definition of “region” is used, some view the Northeast (typically 
thought of as New York to Maine) as a subregion of the larger Northeastern Continental Shelf 
Ecosystem. See BILIANA CICIN-SAIN, WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS OF IMPROVING REGIONAL 
OCEAN GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES, AN OVERVIEW OF POLICY ISSUES AND 
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVED REGIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE 4 (Dec. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.udel.edu/CMS/csmp/pdf/RegionalProceedings.pdf (citing Ken Sherman, Sustainabil-
ity, Biomass Yields, and Health of Coastal Ecosystems: An Ecological Perspective, 112 MARINE 
ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 277, 277-301 (1994). 
 2. For purposes of this article, the discussion of the PTD is limited to the scope of discus-
sion of ROG. A wealth of background and critical analysis exists in legal journals, including Jo-
seph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 
68 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From Its His-
torical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the 
Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 
425 (1989); and Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
351 (1998). 
 3. DAVID C. SLADE, R. KERRY KEHOE & JANE K. STAHL, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE TO WORK 15 (2d ed. 1997). 
 4. Id. at 3. 
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new states.5 In its sovereign capacity, each state has defined the PTD 
through its courts and legislatures depending on societal needs 
through the decades. 
As a result, the Doctrine differs state by state and may still be 
dynamic in its application. In the 1894 case of Shively v. Bowlby,6 the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that: 
[T]here is no universal and uniform law upon the subject, but that 
each State has dealt with the lands under the tidewaters within its 
borders according to its own views of justice and policy, reserving 
its own control over such lands, or granting rights therein to indi-
viduals or corporations, whether owners of the adjoining upland or 
not, as it considered for the best interests of the public. 7 
Furthermore, the Court noted that “[g]reat caution . . . is necessary in 
applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another.”8 
The case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi9 evidences the 
dynamic nature of the Doctrine given that a potential tideland lease-
holder and the state disputed its application to submerged lands af-
fected by the tide but were not navigable in fact.10 The U.S. Supreme 
Court again clarified the independent nature of the Doctrine by rely-
ing on precedent that “it has long been established that the individual 
States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in pub-
lic trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”11 
Ultimately, Mississippi won its claim of title to the tidally influenced 
submerged lands even though the lands were not navigable in fact 
and Mississippi had collected property taxes for decades from private 
owners of those lands.12 
The public’s rights to public trust resources vary by state but are 
based on the Doctrine’s original three rights of fishing, navigation,13 
 
 5. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222, 228-29 (1845) (finding that the new U.S. states 
joined the Union on an equal footing with the original thirteen states). 
 6. 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
 7. Id. at 26. 
 8. Id. 
 9. 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
 10. Id. at 472. 
 11. Id. at 475 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 26). 
 12. Id. at 490. For a full account of the Phillips Petroleum Co. decision and its aftermath in 
Mississippi, see John A. Duff & Kristen M. Fletcher, Augmenting the Public Trust: The Secretary 
of State’s Efforts to Create a Public Trust Ecosystem Regime in Mississippi, 67 MISS. L.J. 645 
(1998). 
 13. However, “navigation” can vary between states; see Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481, 483 
(1818); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 378 (1867); West v. Slick, 326 S.E. 2d 601, 617 (N.C. 
1985). 
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and commerce. In many states, the public’s use of the waterways has 
evolved into an additional public trust right of recreation14 and mod-
ern uses that are “related to the natural uses peculiar to that re-
source.”15 In determining public access to California tidelands, the 
Supreme Court of California noted: 
[a] growing public recognition that one of the most important pub-
lic uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands 
trust—is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so 
that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open 
space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for 
birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and 
climate of the area.16 
Despite these differences in interpretation or application, the 
alienation of trust resources is subject to a standard established in the 
case of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois17 in which the United States 
Supreme Court found that the state of Illinois had abdicated its re-
sponsibility to preserve the waters for the use of the public by ceding 
control of a harbor to a private interest.18 Case law throughout the na-
tion has followed Illinois Central, firmly establishing that a sale of 
public trust lands must be clear and unequivocal, serve a public pur-
pose, and not substantially impair trust resources and their use.19 
At the state level, the PTD is often the oldest submerged lands 
authority and it has been codified by many states and included in 
their Constitutions.20 Thus, while the Doctrine is applied differently 
state by state, it is consistently an integral part of ocean and coastal 
management for balancing uses, conserving living marine resources, 
and managing the shoreline. 
 
 14. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the traditional public rights included the right 
to bathe. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 414 (1842). Additionally, recreational activi-
ties have been deemed to include “whatever is needed for the complete and innocent enjoy-
ment” of trust lands.  Tr. of the Freeholders & Commonalty of Brookhaven v. Smith, 80 N.E. 
665, 670 (N.Y. 1907). 
 15. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 2, at 477. 
 16. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
 17. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 18. Id. at 453. 
 19. Id. at 452-53.  See also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 721-22 (Cal. 
1983); Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 55 (Mich. 1926). 
 20. E.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 4; ALA. 
CONST. art. I, § 24; MINN. CONST. art. II, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. 14, §§ 1, 4; WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 
1. 
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B. The Progression of Regional Ocean Governance 
While the PTD provides a mechanism to manage ocean and 
coastal resources within a state’s jurisdiction, the challenge of inter-
jurisdictional management remains. Political boundaries, often de-
lineated without attention to ecosystems, create inherent hurdles for 
natural resource management. Not surprisingly, this fact was noted by 
two recent documents related to U.S. ocean policy. America’s Living 
Oceans, a report by the Pew Ocean Commission, stated that “[n]ot a 
system at all, U.S. ocean policy is a hodgepodge of individual laws 
that has grown by accretion over the years, often in response to cri-
sis.”21 Similarly, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, in its report 
entitled An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, noted that to “move 
toward an ecosystem-based management approach, government 
should have the institutional capacity to respond to ocean and coastal 
issues in a coordinated fashion across jurisdictional boundaries.”22 
To solve this jurisdictional dilemma, the U.S. Commission on 
Ocean Policy proposed the “voluntary establishment of regional 
ocean councils, developed through a process supported by the Na-
tional Ocean Council, [that] would facilitate the development of re-
gional goals and priorities and improve responses to regional issues.”23 
The Commission believed that the “development and dissemination 
of regionally significant research and information is imperative to 
meet the information needs of managers and support ecosystem-
based decisions.”24 In response, the President’s Ocean Action Plan 
supported the creation of regional collaborations on oceans, coasts, 
and Great Lakes policy in partnership with states, local governments, 
and tribes.25 Specifically, the Plan calls for additional regional collabo-
ration in the Great Lakes and Gulf of Mexico.26 
Following the issuance of the Ocean Action Plan, with federal 
encouragement on several levels, Rhode Island Governor Donald L. 
Carcieri proposed the creation of the Northeast Regional Ocean 
 
 21. PEW OCEANS COMM’N, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA 
CHANGE 26 (2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/env_pew_oceans_final_report.pdf. 
 22. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY 86 (2004), available at 
http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_ rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, U.S. OCEAN ACTION PLAN: THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY 10-11 (2004), 
available at http://ocean.ceq.gov/actionplan.pdf [hereinafter U.S. OCEAN ACTION PLAN]. 
 26. Id. 
04__FLETCHER.DOC 6/12/2006  11:06 AM 
192 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 16:187 
Council (“NROC”) comprised of stakeholders appointed by the gov-
ernors of each state.27 Governor Carcieri contacted the governors of 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont 
noting that “the Northeast region has a significant opportunity to en-
dorse and implement this recommendation [to create a regional 
ocean information system] by enhancing our regional cooperation.”28 
According to Governor Carcieri, the New England states should cre-
ate the NROC to facilitate the development of more coordinated and 
collaborative regional goals and priorities and to improve responses 
to regional issues.29 
Governor Carcieri is also the Chair of the New England Gover-
nors and Eastern Canadian Premieres Conference, a conference of 
leaders from Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, 
New Hampshire, Maine, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Quebec, 
Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland & Labrador that addresses 
“issues of common interest and concern, and enact[s] policy resolu-
tions that call on actions by the state and provincial governments, as 
well as by the two national governments.”30 At its 2005 meeting, the 
conference adopted several resolutions indicating priorities for the 
conference during Governor Carcieri’s two-year term as Chair. The 
Resolutions were Resolution 29-1 on the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership of North America, Resolution 29-2 on Energy, Resolu-
tion 29-3 on the Oceans, and Resolution 29-4 on the Environment.31 
The Resolution Concerning Oceans created an Oceans Working 
Committee to: 
foster international cooperation and collaboration on all aspects of 
marine and ocean related research and development[,] . . . facilitate 
the exchange of information[,] . . . seek partnerships and synergies 
to facilitate existing initiatives such as the Gulf of Maine Council on 
the Marine Environment and encourage new initiatives and part-
nerships[,] . . . address related environmental issues[,] . . . and pro-
 
 27. Testimony of Governor Donald L. Carcieri to the Comm. on Ocean Policy (Apr. 5, 
2005) (on file with author). 
 28. E.g., Letter from Governor Donald L. Carcieri to Governor M. Jodi Rell (Apr. 4, 2005) 
(on file with author). 
 29. Id. 
 30. More information on the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Cana-
dian Premieres is available at http://www.negc.org/premiers.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
 31. Resolutions of the New England Governors Conference are available at 
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
04__FLETCHER.DOC 6/12/2006  11:06 AM 
Spring 2006] OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 193 
vide a vehicle for cooperation on all aspects of ocean manage-
ment.32 
Also, the committee was tasked to make recommendations to the 
Governors and Premieres “on all practical means to expand and en-
hance regional efforts on all ocean related issues.”33 
It is likely more than coincidence that priority issues discussed 
for ROG include several of the priority issues included in the remain-
ing resolutions, especially environmental and energy concerns.34 In 
the Resolution on Energy, the leaders called for information and 
analysis from committees regarding regional fuel and supply diversity, 
assessment of undeveloped natural gas resources in the region, energy 
conservation and efficiency initiatives, and an ongoing discussion be-
tween industry and government on challenges and opportunities for 
the natural gas and related energy sectors.35 The Resolution on the 
Environment called for strategies regarding transport issues, mercury 
reduction, acid rain and air pollution sources, greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and ecosystem-based management approaches.36 
While these resolutions indicate priority areas for ROG consid-
eration, the resolutions are only as strong as the Governors and Pre-
mieres that seek to implement them. On a national scale, discussion 
regarding implementation of ROG has differed from region to region. 
Most discussion has focused on the mechanism(s) for ROG and has 
defined the regions and appropriate issues that should be addressed 
by each region.37 However, managers and policymakers consistently 
 
 32. Resolution 29-3, Resolution Concerning Oceans (Aug. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf. 
 33. Id. 
 34. For a sample of leading issues for regional concern, see CICIN-SAIN, supra note 1, at 7. 
The concerns listed include fishing habitats and stocks, conflicts between protected marine 
mammals, marine transportation, land development patterns, and implications of development 
of new uses of the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), such as offshore aquaculture and wind 
farming. See also INTEGRATED COASTAL MANAGEMENT, UNCED AGENDA 21 ch. 17.3 (1992), 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21 chapter17.htm 
(defining the EEZ as “an important marine area where the States manage the development and 
conservation of natural resources for the benefit of their people”). 
 35. Resolution 29-2, Resolution Concerning Energy (Aug. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf. 
 36. Resolution 29-4, Resolution on the Environment (Aug. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf. 
 37. See KIM ENGIE, AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL COORDINATION IN THE GREAT LAKES, 
GULF OF MAINE, AND CHESAPEAKE BAY (2004) available at http://courses.washington.edu/ 
oceangov/reference_mtls/USRegOview.pdf. 
04__FLETCHER.DOC 6/12/2006  11:06 AM 
194 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 16:187 
state that ROG must be part of the solution rather than a “solution 
looking for a problem.”38 
C. Functional Regional Governance: Litigation and Compacts 
A regional governance system may offer a variety of functions 
such as providing coordination and management between states, serv-
ing as an information sharing mechanism, or supplying a decision-
making structure. The New England Governors and Eastern Cana-
dian Premieres is a hybrid mechanism; it has only a few obligations 
attached, and its most common function has been information sharing 
with some management-related activities, depending upon the issue.39 
However, other formal and informal efforts exist, offering lessons for 
ROG efforts in New England. 
Northeastern states (and in some cases, states from other re-
gions) have joined forces to coordinate multi-party litigation, includ-
ing the tobacco litigation begun in 1994 that led to a national effort by 
more than forty states to sue tobacco companies.40 More recently, a 
lawsuit began by eight states to fight CO2 emissions as a pollutant, 
shows that the environment and public health are rising “to the fore-
front as a cause for the Attorneys General.”41 Columbia Law School 
held a symposium entitled “The Role of State Attorneys General in 
National Environmental Policy” in 2004, and the comments of the At-
torneys General are instructive lessons for regional efforts, whether 
based on a short-term, single issue, or a long-term suite of problems. 
The number of states involved in any effort defines the lawsuit. 
More coordination is needed as the number of involved states in-
creases. In addition, the more states, the more resources that will be 
 
 38. John H. Dunnigan, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Ecosystem Goal Team, Lec-
ture at the Coastal Zone Conference (July 20, 2005). 
 39. The Council of Atlantic Premieres describes the relationship of the Conference of New 
England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers as “a unique and highly effective interna-
tional relationship of states and provinces sharing ideas and building on historic ties. The Con-
ference advances the interests of the eleven jurisdictions through cooperation and encourages 
collaboration with the private sector.” See http://www.cap-cpma.ca/default.asp?mn=1.62.4.28 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2006). 
 40. For analysis of the tobacco litigation, see Wendy E. Parmet, Tobacco, HIV and the 
Courtroom: The Role of Affirmative Litigation in the Formation of Public Health Policy, 36 
HOUS. L. REV. 1663 (1999); Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, 
Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143 
(2001). 
 41. The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy: Welcome & 
Global Warming Panel, Part I, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335, 347 (2005) (statement of Richard 
Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut). 
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available. The importance of the number and characteristics of states 
in lawsuits is especially evident in CO2 lawsuits with larger states such 
as New York and California as parties.42 As more states commit to the 
effort, it will become increasingly clear to the public, private sector, 
and federal government that it is an issue worthy of significant atten-
tion and dedication of resources. 
Another concern in litigation is the ability to sue in one court 
rather than several courts. In explaining the relative benefit of the 
CO2 litigation, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecti-
cut, noted: 
We’re also lucky because we’re in one court. . . . For tobacco, we 
were in 50 different states, 50 different courts, so we had to make 
sure one state wasn’t saying something that would hurt another 
state, so here the coordination problem is better. Iowa demon-
strates the stake of the Midwest in this problem and shows that 
there’s not just one coast, but a national problem. So there are ways 
that additional states can help in this problem.43 
One reality of multi-state efforts is that benefits might not always be 
easily shown. Often, more subtle benefits are overlooked. Tom 
Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, noted that “the underlying point is 
that trying to do the right thing, and trying to do it together and sup-
port each other, is a wonderful intangible [benefit].”44 Blumenthal ex-
plains that the rationale for any multi-party effort may not be clear 
from the beginning; rather, it may begin as an instinct: 
And in a way, this lawsuit began with a lump in the throat, a gut 
feeling, emotion, that CO2 pollution and global warming were 
problems that needed to be addressed. They were urgent and im-
mediate and needed some kind of action, and it wasn’t coming from 
the federal government. And it also began with a lump in the 
throat. David Hawkins and I were sitting having bagels, brain-
storming about what could be done. This was 3 1/2 years ago, and 
we agreed that we would each think, explore, [and] research about 
it.45 
While individual states or a regional council may develop a checklist 
of qualities concerning issues to be addressed regionally, in the end, 
the council may be most effective when the leaders share an instinct 
that the problem must be addressed collectively. 
 
 42. Id. at 346 (statement of Richard Blumenthal). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 349. 
 45. Id. at 339. 
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Interstate compacts represent a more formal approach for states 
to join together on common issues and have served a major role in 
governing natural resources.46 The basis for negotiating interstate 
compacts is found in the U.S. Constitution, which states that “no state 
shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or 
compact with another state or with a foreign power.”47 This compact 
clause implicitly recognizes state power to negotiate and enter into 
agreements subject to congressional consent. Formation of an inter-
state compact typically has three stages: (1) Congress authorizes ne-
gotiation of the compact, usually with a federal representative as part 
of the negotiations, (2) states enter into compact negotiations, and (3) 
Congress consents to the negotiated compact.48 
The resulting interstate compact is a legal instrument that binds 
states to formal cooperation. There is no limit to the number of states 
which may be involved in an interstate compact. Interstate compacts 
are useful in that they can address regional problems of concern to 
particular states which are transboundary but too localized to be a na-
tional issue. A key example is the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Compact.49 
In 1942, Congress approved an interstate compact and created 
the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (“ASMFC”), which 
served as an advisory board with the power to make legislative rec-
ommendations regarding common fish species in the state waters of 
15 coastal Atlantic States.50 In 1993, Congress enacted the Atlantic 
 
 46. For more information on interstate compacts for natural resource management, see Jill 
Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 
FLA. L. REV. 1 (1997); Jeffrey Uhlman Beaverstock, Learning to Get Along: Alabama, Georgia, 
Florida and the Chattahoochee River Compact, 49 ALA. L. REV. 993 (1998); Joseph W. Dellap-
enna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the Opening of the 21st Century, 
25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9 (2002); Jonathan I. Charney, The Delimitation of Lateral 
Seaward Boundaries Between States in a Domestic Context, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 28 (1981); 
Marlissa S. Briggett, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact, 18 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 751 (1991). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 48. See FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF 




 49. 77 Pub. L. 539, 56 Stat. 267 (1942) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101 - 5108 (2000)). 
 50. The states are: Florida (Atlantic coast only), Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Is-
land, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine. Elizabeth C. Scott, Managing the Maine Lob-
ster Fishery: An Evaluation of Alternatives, 20 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 573, 583 (2001). 
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Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act expanding the 
Commission’s authority to include the creation of coastal manage-
ment plans and findings of state noncompliance.51 The Atlantic States 
were to use the ASMFC as a vehicle for joint management of impor-
tant coastal fisheries with other member states, rather than continuing 
to promulgate varying state-by-state regulations.52 
The Commission views the rebound of the striped bass popula-
tion as one of its greatest successes but notes that the success was 
based on common values implemented among the member states. 53 
These values include respect of state sovereignty, transparency in 
programs and actions, and flexibility within conservation parame-
ters.54 The rationale for member states is to provide collective, coop-
erative management and to make decisions that are “good for all ver-
sus best for one.”55 With fifteen member states, members can pool 
their scientific resources and, in some cases, streamline data collec-
tion. Ultimately, the Commission hopes to provide states with incen-
tives to act but has access to action forcing mechanisms.56 
The benefits of an interstate compact include greater efficiency 
than a federal regulatory response because states in a region are gen-
erally more familiar with a problem and can be more responsive to 
local and regional needs.57 Unlike informal interstate cooperation, a 
compact is binding to the citizens of the member states and provides a 
formal mechanism for states to reduce jurisdictional hurdles associ-
ated with transboundary problems.58 The process of political adjust-
ment required to negotiate a compact allows the parties to specify de-
cisionmaking procedures and standards. 
However, in reality, states may not always cooperate intensively 
or continuously. For political purposes, states’ chief executives may 
insist upon negotiation between Governors, resulting in intermittent 
progress. A lack of intensive cooperation may lead to protracted ne-
gotiation and disagreement, exacerbating delay. Rather than repre-
 
 51. 16 U.S.C. § 5101. 
 52. Scott, supra note 48, at 583-84. 
 53. Statement of Vince O’Shea, Executive Dir., Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm’n (Jan. 
13, 2006) (on file with author). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Stephen David Galowitz, Interstate Metro-Regional Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 
27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49, 118-23 (1992). 
 58. Id. at 45. 
04__FLETCHER.DOC 6/12/2006  11:06 AM 
198 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 16:187 
senting the interests of the region, members of these interstate bodies 
typically represent the interests of their respective jurisdictions. 
Finally, states may not unilaterally amend the compact without 
the consent of all signatory states.59 While this is a sign of respect for 
sovereignty (noted above as a strength in the context of the ASMFC), 
it also may cause delays and makes adaptive management a chal-
lenge. 
Even with action forcing mechanisms at the disposal of the 
ASMFC, consensus is the key mechanism of action. Voting rules not-
withstanding, many commissions have often found it necessary to 
proceed by consensus. This suggests that “political considerations 
cannot be sidestepped by granting a regional organization more for-
mal authority[;] . . . decisions are going to be made by a process of ne-
gotiation and consent-building, not by the fiat of a regional agency.”60 
Perhaps because of the political costs to create and maintain them 
and their mixed record of success, “very few of [the recently emerging 
organizational arrangements for watersheds] have sought to transfer 
powers and authorities from existing agencies to a watershed author-
ity” and have focused instead on less formal collaborative institu-
tions.61 
A final notable challenge to the creation of a compact appears at 
the legislative level. Interstate compacts require agreement by all 
state legislatures. Each legislature must adopt necessary legislation to 
become a member state and may need to amend existing laws to do 
so.62 In the context of ROG, state leaders will need to account for con-
flicts of laws that might prevent the state from becoming part of a lar-
ger body or participating fully in a body that specifically addresses 
ocean issues. 
With these lessons in mind, federal structures also provide simi-
lar guidance for the advancement of transboundary management. 
One commentator notes that the affirmative stewardship responsibil-
 
 59. Id. at 46. 
 60. Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 392 (2000) (citing Helen M. Ingram, The Political Economy of 
Regional Watershed Institutions, 55 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 10, 17 (1973)). 
 61. Id. at 392 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW STRATEGIES FOR AMERICA’S 
WATERSHEDS 186 (1999)). 
 62. For a review of the role of federal and state consent in interstate compacts, see Marlissa 
S. Briggett, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 751, 757-67 (1991). For a review of challenges of interstate compacts, see Jill Elaine 
Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. 
REV. 1 (1997). 
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ity for managers of the National Wildlife Refuge System “provides a 
statutory basis for application of the Public Trust Doctrine.”63 Thus, 
the presence of an affirmative stewardship duty may “finally generate 
a body of public trust case law and practices for the federal public 
lands”64 and serve “as a basis for the [Fish and Wildlife] Service to de-
fend more assertive protection of the refuges, especially when dealing 
with external threats.”65 This attempt to address pressures from out-
side the refuges’ boundaries represents a federal approach to regional 
management and reaffirms the role of the PTD and incentives for the 
states to act as resource trustees. 
III.  THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
In considering ROG, the role of the PTD is often overlooked. 
Indeed, the Doctrine itself may be overlooked as a tool for trans-
boundary resource management. With its historic and current role in 
marine resource management, its codification into state law, and its 
flexibility in implementation, the PTD can act as a vehicle to advance 
ROG rather than as a hindrance. Even though it is applied differently 
from state to state, the fundamental elements of the Doctrine can tie 
the efforts of each state together. 
Of course, the PTD has its critics, including those that posit the 
Doctrine is out of step with modern environmental laws that seek to 
allow adaptive management for resources or as a tool used to avoid 
making difficult political decisions.66 While some critics point to its 
basis in property law and trust management as limiting,67 it is this trust 
relationship that allows for transboundary management of trust lands 
and waters. The role of the state as a trustee over resources should 
not be undervalued, especially in the context of multi-state efforts to 
manage or conserve marine resources. 
A key to understanding the role of the Doctrine in ROG is that 
“it is the nature of this specific land, not who manages the land, which 
 
 63. See Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of 
Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 581 (2002). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 582. 
 66. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 687-90 (1986); James L. 
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 
ENVTL. L. 527, 556 (1989); James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Com-
ment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 
DENV. U. L. REV. 565, 582-84 (1986). 
 67. See Rose, supra note 2, at 356. 
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makes it subject to the Public Trust.”68 Thus, the similarities between 
the states’ public trust resources are more significant than the subtle 
(and sometimes not so subtle) differences between state doctrines. 
The fact that states have codified the PTD in their constitutions 
and statutes is evidenced by the role it has in marine resource man-
agement, especially concerning the harvest of living marine resources, 
as well as in evolving public interest in enjoying the coasts. The 
Rhode Island Constitution provides that people of the state “shall 
continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of the fishery, and 
privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore entitled 
under the charter and usages of the state.”69 The Constitution pro-
vides that privileges of the shore include “fishing from the shore, the 
gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea, and pas-
sage along the shore.”70 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has 
codified public trust principles in Chapter 91 authorizing the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection to protect the public interest in 
“tidelands, Great Ponds, and non-tidal rivers and streams in accor-
dance with the PTD as established by common law and codified in the 
Colonial Ordinances of 1641-47 and subsequent statutes and case law 
of Massachusetts.”71 
These codifications show the inherently common nature of re-
sources, and though they may differ in specific language or prioritiza-
tion of uses, the fundamental rationale for their protection is the 
same. In the context of interstate resource use and protection, states 
have the right to protect their natural resources, even in the face of 
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. In Maine v. Taylor,72 a 
case in which “[o]nce again, a little fish has caused a commotion,”73 
the Supreme Court held that the state “retains broad regulatory au-
thority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity 
of its natural resources” as long as the methods do not represent “an 
arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce” or could not 
adequately be served by nondiscriminatory alternatives.74 This deci-
 
 68. See Kelly McGrath, The Feasibility of Using Zoning to Reduce Conflicts in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, 11 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 183, 191 (2004). 
 69. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.01(2)(a) (1987). 
 72. 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
 73. Id. at 132. 
 74. Id. at 151 (holding that states retain broad regulatory authority to protect the health 
and safety of citizens and the integrity of natural resources). 
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sion bolstered the security of the PTD as a tool for states to protect 
resources and citizens’ rights to use those resources. 
Though this decision clarifies the use of the Doctrine in the con-
text of out-of-state use of a trust resource, a remaining challenge to 
the PTD as a basis for ROG is the application of the Doctrine for 
competing in-state interests. Many of the PTD’s protected uses con-
flict, and the Doctrine “creates no specific hierarchy in the uses.”75 
Thus, state legislatures and agencies must balance the suitability of 
uses to the marine environment.76 Courts have begun to weigh in on 
this undeveloped aspect of the Doctrine. In Weden v. San Juan 
County,77 the Washington Supreme Court determined that a county 
ordinance prohibiting navigation and recreational use by personal wa-
tercraft is consistent with the state’s PTD because “it would be an odd 
use of the PTD to sanction an activity that actually harms and dam-
ages the waters and wildlife of this state.”78 
Other courts have begun to see the evolution of the PTD from a 
use doctrine to one that includes resource protection. In the 1983 case 
of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,79 the California Su-
preme Court applied the PTD to the appropriation of water, finding 
that a two-step public trust review was warranted.80 First, the court 
called for “a ‘responsible body’ [to] balance the appropriator’s needs 
with the watershed’s needs to determine whether ‘the benefit gained 
is worth the price.’”81 Second, the court called for this body to deter-
mine “whether some lesser taking would better balance the diverse 
interests.”82 
Prior to National Audubon Society, courts had not applied the 
PTD in this way.83 Thus, the decision “potentially allowed the state to 
reallocate water from private consumptive uses to public instream 
uses.”84 While the decision did not yield subsequent PTD pronounce-
 
 75. Donna R. Christie, Marine Reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and Intergenerational 
Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 427, 432 (2004). 
 76. Id. 
 77. 958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998). 
 78. Id. at 284. 
 79. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
 80. See id. at 728. 
 81. Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text and Context, 27 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1155, 1162 (1995) (citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1155. 
 84. Id. 
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ments,85 the California State Water Resources Control Board “has 
begun to articulate the trust’s meaning and its legal place in the west-
ern water allocation system . . . [culminating] in two recent State Wa-
ter Board decisions that have finally fulfilled National Audubon Soci-
ety’s promise to reallocate water from existing appropriations to 
public trust-protected uses.”86 These decisions reallocated water, both 
among trust uses and between trust and consumptive uses, based on 
the PTD. 
National Audubon Society shows the use of the PTD in complex 
natural resource management decisions, especially those addressing 
shared or migratory resources such as freshwater. In the context of 
multi-jurisdictional issues, water as a shared resource is especially in-
structive. In arguing the common property status of the waters of the 
Great Lakes Basin, one commentator noted that because water is a 
resource: 
It would seem, then, that the riparian doctrine’s reasonable use re-
quirement and the public trust doctrine both place significant limi-
tations on the use of the Great Lakes and their tributary waters. . . . 
If one treats the public resource under such a public trust-type doc-
trine, it would presuppose an existing servitude on the resource and 
would not allow for private taking.87 
The public trust guiding principles are woven into the Final Re-
port to the Governments of Canada and the United States issued by 
the International Joint Commission in 2000,88 which balances domes-
tic and foreign extractive uses based on doctrines of sustainable de-
velopment, equitable use, public trust, and unilateral declaration. The 
Great Lakes example shows that states have not only the right, but 
also the duty, to regulate resource consumption, including trust re-
sources, with the effects on current and future generations in mind.89 
The water management decisions in California and the Great 
Lakes Basin show that working on a regional scale can actually assist 
Northeastern states in meeting their PTD responsibility. The ASMFC 
 
 85. Weber notes that “[f]or the first dozen years after its announcement, the decision had 
not spawned a single reallocation of water from a consumptive to an instream use. In short, the 
Doctrine’s promise remained largely inchoate and its message largely inarticulate.” Id. at 1156. 
 86. Id. at 1156-57. 
 87. Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, The Necessity of Preventing Unilateral Re-
sponses to Water Scarcity – The Next Major Threat against Mankind this Century, 9 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 38 (2001). 
 88. INT’L JOINT COMM’N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (2000). 
 89. Diaz & Dubner, supra note 82, at 39. 
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is also instructive: Considering that fishing is one of the Doctrine’s 
original three protected uses, it is easy to see the connection between 
the Northeastern states PTD responsibilities and their agreement to 
manage shared resources through the ASMFC. A principle goal of 
the ASMFC is to provide better coordination between states for con-
servation of shared stocks.90 Underlying this rationale is the fact that 
citizens of each state have the right to fish and will harvest marine re-
sources. A body such as the ASMFC works to advance PTD respon-
sibilities and principles. 
Multi-state litigation also provides a basis for viewing the PTD as 
an advancement of regional governance principles. Even without a 
formal mechanism, multi-state litigation is based on the states’ police 
powers (those responsibilities that are inherent in a state to meet the 
needs of its citizens). In the two examples given above, public health 
served as the incentive for multi-state litigation. Given the nature of 
Long Island Sound, the Gulf of Maine, or the air-shed above the pub-
lic waters of the Northeast, the health of these shared public re-
sources can serve as motivation for seeking a multi-state solution to a 
damaging actor or factor. 
From the perspective of the emerging NROC, the PTD remains a 
shared principle for the states to rely upon, providing common link-
ages of public access, management, and conservation of marine re-
sources. At the August 2005 meeting, the New England Governors 
and Eastern Canadian Premieres prioritized energy defense and eco-
system management for a regional approach.91 Add to this the more 
specific problems such as energy facility siting, water quality, or man-
agement of transboundary living resources, and the PTD serves as an 
important tool in the suite of state and federal statutory and common 
law principles to advance a regional approach to marine resource 
management. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A primary challenge for the NROC or any ROG effort in the 
United States is finding incentives, either in the shape of an action 
forcing mechanism such as the ASMFC or long-term shared problems 
and negotiated solutions as seen in the Great Lakes. To move toward 
ecosystem-based management, a multi-jurisdictional effort is essen-
 
 90. 77 Pub. L. 539, 56 Stat. 267; 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5108 (2000). 
 91. Resolution 29-2, Resolution Concerning Energy (Aug. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf. 
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tial, but the incentives to expend the resources to work in a regional 
fashion are still vague. 
The PTD not only provides states with a mechanism to manage 
marine resources, but also provides a common basis for managing 
their own and shared marine resources. Furthermore, the Doctrine 
calls for states to act as trustees, a principle codified in state constitu-
tions and statutes. It is this trust principle that should guide the evolu-
tion of ROG in the Northeast and across the country. 
